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Abstract: In a broader research project my principal aim is to analyse contemporary French 
legal philosophy and to highlight its historical origins and its connections to other legal 
cultures. The framework is based on Hart’s ‘persistent questions’ whereas the content consists 
of the ‘would-be answers’ of French legal philosophers. With regard to these Hartian 
questions, this paper develops the following argument. Although law itself is intrinsically 
connected to a given political community characterised by its culture and history, legal 
philosophy recommends an abstract and general approach to law. ‘Abstractness’ and 
‘generality’ urge the legal philosopher to treat basic legal problems independently of this or 
that legal system. I shall argue that this ‘independence’ requires analysing the spirit of the 
legal system rather than positive law. The pursuit of legal philosophy seems feasible if legal 
philosophers can elaborate sufficiently ‘basic questions’ that can be ‘transposed’ to other legal 
cultures and if by answering these they can understand the spirit of the other legal system. My 
claim is that Hart’s ‘persistent questions’ meet these criteria. 
 
Le plupart de mes collègues détestent la philosophie. (Villey 1989, 25) 
 
Since fairly long, lawyers, students and scholars coming from different legal cultures have 
known Hart almost by heart.
1
 Also the perplexities at the beginning of his The Concept of 
Law have become commonplaces: ‘How does law differ from and how it is related to orders 
backed by threats? How does legal obligation differ from, and how is it related to, moral 
obligation? What are rules and to what extent is law an affair of rules?’ (Hart 1961, 13). 
 
In this essay I am going to argue that these questions arising from his ‘perplexities’ may be 
considered as ‘general problems of legal philosophy’. It would be, without doubt, somewhat 
far-fetched to say that these are the general problems of legal philosophy. My claim here is 
more modest and necessarily abstract, which may account for the title. I shall merely plead for 
the feasibility of legal philosophy, adding that Hart’s ‘perplexities’ can be conceived of as its 
‘basic’ questions. I hope to provide logical arguments while trying to avoid contingent 
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  Author’s thanks go to all who made comments on this text, either during the roundtable discussion or 
afterwards in the course of writing this essay, especially to Péter Cserne and Miklós Könczöl. 
historical and/or sociological explanations. Such arguments are indeed necessary since 






Any serious theoretical attempt in the field of social philosophy, which seeks to understand 
the ‘point’ of any regulation of human behaviour in a given society has to face the following 
problems. On the one hand, a normative system is intrinsically connected to a given political 
community with its particular culture and history. On the other hand, a social philosophy must 
be an abstract and general approach to the normative systems or else it cannot be called 
‘philosophy’. Even if the meaning of ‘social’ and ‘practical’ is still in question, no one has 
seriously questioned that legal philosophy has certain features in common with social (or 
practical) philosophy. 
 
By virtue of the ‘abstractness’ and ‘generality’ of legal philosophy, its basic problems have to 
be treated independently of the content of a given legal system. ‘Independence’ requires the 
scholar to analyse not positive law but the ‘spirit’ of the legal system. The pursuit of legal 
philosophy is feasible only if legal philosophers formulate questions that are sufficiently 
‘basic’ and capable of being ‘transposed’ to other legal cultures, and if by answering these 
one can understand the ‘spirit’ of the other legal system as well. ‘Spirit’ is something less than 
the ‘essence’, but more than the ‘content’ of the law. Usually, it has a political character, and 
is shaped by contingent factual circumstances and crystallised from the social practice and 
institutional framework of a given legal system. Nonetheless, ‘spirit’ is something that needs 
to be elaborated in a formal and abstract way. 
 
One may state for example that the ‘spirit’ of French law has to be defined with reference to 
‘equality’ (égalité). This is a highly abstract concept which calls for an abstract philosophical 
explanation. Still, if one really seeks to understand it, one must not forget to take into account 
the contingent criteria of its application – or, as Rawls or Dworkin would put it, the various 
conceptions of the concept of ‘equality’ – throughout French history since the Revolution or 
even before it.
3
 Positive legal rules of the French legal system of a given period contain these 
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  See for example Le Fur 1937  
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  Cf. Hart (1963, vii): ‘justice is a concept of complex structure within which we should distinguish a 
constant formal element and a varying material element. This distinction might be presented in terms used in 
criteria of application. One should take these into account but one should also bear in mind 
that without philosophical explanation they are insufficient to demonstrate the ‘spirit’ of that 
system. Obviously, a particular French theory of justice as equality without reference to legal 




One can formulate many kinds of arguments (sociological, historical, etc.) for the very 
existence of legal philosophy. Here I take into account only those using (or being compelled 
by logic to use) philosophical justifications. I would like to show that even an ‘empirical’ 
legal theory cannot dispense with philosophy. 
 
Let me give two examples. Reading Kelsen’s apologetic essays on the purity of legal science 
as opposed to the ‘impure’ philosophy of justice, one can discover without much intellectual 
effort that the author uses a simplified neo-Kantian framework coupled with an even more 
oversimplified anti-cognitivist meta-ethics (which are, by the way, inconsistent with one 
another) (see Kelsen 1960). Now, in the light of subsequent criticism, it is a commonplace 
today to state that the whole Kelsenian enterprise is nothing but ‘normative metaphysics.’ In 
Kelsen’s case, the reader finds no serious justification for the choice of the philosophical 
framework (why ‘purity’?) or for its possible meta-ethical corollary (why ‘impurity’?). 
 
The second example may be less known to those not familiar with French legal philosophers. 
According to Léon Duguit, scholarly research in the field of law has to focus on the facts if it 
is to avoid metaphysics. Like later Ross, Duguit argues that normative concepts are 
meaningless, since they have no facts as their semantic references. Although the original 
targets of his criticism were Rousseau’s notion of the ‘general will’ and German doctrines of 
subjective rights (these theories were rejected by Kelsen as well), his anti-metaphysical stance 
clearly opposed him to the author of the Pure Theory. For Duguit, only an individual will can 
be considered as empirical fact. It is not some imaginary social contract but solidarity that 
integrates these individuals to a human community. Solidarity is a social fact and it is based 
on the empirically observable sense of justice. This sense being the same in the case of every 
individual, one can reformulate it by using general patterns. In order to justify that general 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
recent English moral philosophy as one between the constant definition of justice and the varying criteria for its 
application [...]’ See also my presentation of the Dworkinian theory of justice in a French context (Paksy 2009). 
principles of justice are empirically well-founded, Duguit simply claims that the authors of 
the best theories of justice, like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, were sociologists. What 
counts for our purpose, however, is the very fact that Duguit’s argument for empiricism is 
clearly ‘philosophical’. It goes without saying that he pays a considerable price with the 
argument of ‘Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas were sociologists’ when he tries to avoid 
metaphysics in this highly superficial way. In fact, it would have been more adequate and less 
controversial to accept that the notion of solidarity implies normative – not empirical – 
research in the field of legal theory (or philosophy) (see Duguit 2003 [1901] and 1927). 
 
For our present purpose, it suffices to see that even ‘positivist’ and/or empirical legal theory 
implies philosophical argumentation. In this sense, ‘philosophical’ simply means that the 
research is not purely empirical. And, on the other hand, if it is feasible, it is not necessarily 
counterfactual either. I shall not analyse the second option here, for now I am going to focus 
on Hart who did not use this theoretical ‘trump’.4 
 
It seems that Hart’s famous perplexities have an overlapping area, namely, the problem of 
normativity. His major contribution to legal philosophy consisted in finding a middle way 
between empiricism and idealism with regard to the problem of normativity and his 
theoretical path was justified in a philosophical way. When speaking of ‘perplexities’, he 
seems to be using the methodological tools of ordinary language philosophy (see Green 1997, 
1688, n. 1). Yet he is not satisfied with a possible conclusion which would state that the task 
of legal philosophy is to ‘clarify’ or ‘correct’ the ordinary language of lawyers (see Bayles 
1992, ch. 1). 
 
I am far from saying that this is unproblematic. Kelsen would separate the ‘ordinary’ 
discourse of lawyers from the language of legal science, separating ‘what the law should be’ 
(lawyers’ ‘impure’ discourse) from ‘what the law is’ (‘pure’ discourse on lawyers’ ‘impure’ 
discourse). This is one reason why Kelsen could not come to the problem of normativity 
through linguistic analysis. Duguit would say, following Comte, that legal discourse has no 
meaning, since in this discourse ‘meaningless’ metaphysical concepts are used. However, if 
the normative discourse is ‘pointless’ or ‘meaningless’, the problem of normativity is 
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necessarily excluded from scholarly research on law. Hart’s argument against Scandinavian 
realists can be used, mutatis mutandis, against Duguit as well (see Hart 1955). 
 
Hart’s first problem (‘How does law differ from and how it is related to orders backed by 
threats?’) can be interpreted to raise the question of whether the ‘vagueness’ or ‘open texture’ 
of ordinary and legal language calls for ‘philosophical’ arguments or not. Perhaps ‘vagueness’ 
implies discretion in the case of the application of law, or ‘perplexities’ if the concept of law 
is in question but it is the very problem of normativity which cries for philosophy. The 
question of how and why rules are to be followed is independent of the question of whether 
these rules are vague or not. Methodologically, the same distinction can be made between the 
vagueness of a concept of law and the discretionary character of legal adjudication, caused by 
the open texture of the legal rules. Whenever an official is obliged to slot some empirically 
observable fact into a legal category (‘Is the atheist church a church at all?’), (s)he does not 
use logic but decides and, for the sake of legitimacy, develops a reasoning in order to justify 
his or her decision. Legal philosophy should show for what reasons an official is obliged to 
decide. This is a sufficiently general and abstract question, independent of the cultural or 
political context of the given legal system. An official is obliged to decide, regardless of 
whether it is explicitly or – as Article 4 of the French Civil Code stipulates it – implicitly 
prescribed by law. In the latter case, legal philosophy is able to transform the latent obligation 
into a manifest one. 
 
Hart’s legal philosophy is characterized by himself as a ‘descriptive sociology’ seeking to 
describe law as a complex system of rules from an internal point of view. Still, one may 
object that the ‘generality’ of legal philosophy is highly questionable because of the 
uniqueness of legal systems. As I mentioned earlier, ‘uniqueness’ here stems from the 
particularities of national history and political culture. Is legal philosophy an impossible 
pursuit then? I think this is not the case. But my claim about the spirit of the legal system 
notwithstanding, I may agree with someone saying that no legal philosopher can elaborate a 
position independent of his or her own legal culture. Indeed, The Concept of Law is an 
important contribution to one’s legal discourse – provided one has a ‘common law mind’. Are 
the ‘perplexities’ mentioned at the very beginning of Hart’s book too ‘British’ to be 
considered as ‘general problems’ of legal philosophy? Let us now have a look at this question. 
 
A purely contextualist theory of legal scholarship would take a sceptical attitude. One could 
claim that Hart was a product of his time and socio-economic context and that The Concept of 
Law is nothing but a reflection of that. Simplistic as it is, such criticism is sometimes 
formulated against others, like Kelsen (‘The pure theory is in fact impure, because it is 
Austrian’). In France it had been a commonplace for many scholars that the “pure theory” fits 
well to the federal system of Austria but it loses plausibility when applied to describe the legal 
structure of the Third Republic in France. This attitude changed when French scholars were to 
be faced with the problem of constitutional adjudication during the Fifth Republic. In this 
situation they re-read Kelsen in a decontextualised way in order to justify this new and strange 
institution.  
There is an obvious reply to the above mentioned kind of criticism: a purely contextualist 
reading may backfire, as it cannot justify for what reason it and it alone is not a product of its 
socio-economic context. And even if there are such reasons, it cannot be shown that these are 
not products of their socio-cultural context… 
 
It seems clear on the other hand that the opposite, i.e. a ‘pure’ analytical legal theory, is 
impossible, too. Even in its purest form, it reflects to a certain extent at least the prejudices of 
its author. Complete ‘generality’ can never be obtained. Even within the common law family, 
one can observe different institutional frameworks: ‘constitutionalism’ or ‘Rule of Law’ can 
be justified in various ways in different common law systems with a rigid written constitution 
(USA), with no written constitution (UK), or with a written but more or less flexible 
constitution (Canada) (see Corcoran 2010). In France, a scholar who has been trained in the 
field of (uncodified) administrative law necessarily has a different attitude towards 
codification than a civilist who, at least in some respects, regards the two hundred years old 
Code as the ‘holy scriptures’ (see Steiner 2010). A moderate Cartesianism is still plausible: 





On the basis of the above arguments, it seems feasible to write an essay with Hart’s ‘persistent 
questions’ as the theoretical framework, with the content consisting of ‘would-be answers’ of 




One of the ‘persistent questions’ concerns the difference between the brigand’s and the 
legislator’s commands. I do not claim that the following is the only way to ‘translate’ this 
question and to put it into a French context. It is nevertheless possible to discuss the problem 
this way without seriously misinterpreting either Hart or the French legal culture. 
 
For Hart and other English-speaking theorists, the ‘gunman’ is nothing but a methodological 
construction (or analytical tool), since these political communities (UK, USA, Canada, New 
Zealand, etc.) have never really experienced a ‘brigand-state under the rule of gunmen’, 
namely, a totalitarian and/or authoritarian regime. The case was, however, different on the 
Continent. The Vichy government (1940–1942) in France may be seen as a regime governed 
by a group of brigands. Even though their coup d’Etat was justified by certain of the relevant 
French constitutional theories, they were brigands as their commands were obviously and – to 
use Gustav Radbruch’s terminology (Radbruch  2006 [1946], 7) – intolerably unjust. One of 
the questions for a legal philosopher is related to the positivist attitude of the professors of 
that time: does legal positivism mean that a professor, like Maurice Duverger, is incapable of 
criticising these commands? According to Danièle Lochak this attitude was one of the Vichy 
government’s main sources of legitimacy, and she puts the blame on legal positivism in 
general. Michel Troper defends legal positivism and accuses these lawyers of ‘antipositivism’ 
(see Lochak 1989; Troper 1989). 
 
The ‘Duverger case’ is obviously different from the debate that took place between Hart and 
Fuller. In English-speaking legal cultures, where constitutionalism has been continuous, 
professors of law have not been forced to justify their arguments with references to ‘science’ 
[science juridique]. During the 19th and 20th centuries, in Continental literature the ‘science’ 
of law somehow replaced the constitution itself (in Germany) or the authority of the 
constitution (in France). In Anglo-American legal philosophy the central theoretical question 
was that of the obedience to unjust laws, while on the Continent professors accused one 
another of providing additional legitimacy for the tyrannical legislation when writing 
commentaries on inadmissible statutes. By contrasting these debates, it becomes apparent that 
the problem of normativity is formulated in different ways. 
 
3.2 
 In The Concept of Law, Hart develops a theory of interpretation according to which 
interpretative power must be conferred on the official when applying law because of the open 
texture of normative texts. The very notion of ‘open texture’ is culturally independent, and for 
British and French legal cultures at least, it is true that the original idea was to establish a 
strictly limited judicial authority which gives effect to the legislative intent as formulated in 
normative texts. In the common law tradition, canons guiding statutory interpretation have 
been justified from both apexes of the institutional hierarchy. On the one hand, the ideology 
of parliamentary sovereignty requires that judges give full effect to the legislative will. On the 
other hand, legislative penetration into the local ius commune (the common law) have been 
considered as an exception and for this reason judges can and should limit this somehow 
‘illegitimate’ legislative activity. 
 
Montesquieu’s famous metaphor of the judge who should be the ‘mouthpiece of the law’ (la 
bouche de la loi) seems to be a common point for both continental and common law cultures. 
As it is well known, Montesquieu used this metaphor in the chapter of his Spirit of Laws 
where he ‘described’ the British constitutional system. The original French text uses the term 
loi, which translates as ‘statute’ (lex) rather than ‘law’ (ius), and it was true that judges tried to 
limit themselves to the ‘plain meaning’ when performing statutory interpretation. 
Montesquieu deliberately avoided the term droit (law), for it is obvious that the metaphor 
would not be plausible for case law or equity (cf. L’Esprit des Lois, Ch. 11). 
 
However, in Montesquieu’s theory it is the legislation that is regarded as the centre of gravity 
in social regulation. According to him, the best case would be if the legislator were able to 
remove citizens’ prejudices, and in this way, the judges being at the same time citizens, they 
might lose their prejudices, too. With this argument in mind, it does not really matter whether 
the term loi or droit was used by Montesquieu. Reading the chapter on the British legal 
system in that way, one is compelled to interpret it as normative political philosophy or utopia 
hidden in a descriptive sociological text. In this sense, Montesquieu’s claim was that in an 
enlightened society – and the Britons were certainly closer to this than feudal France – the 
judicial power should not be a power at all. The question of whether it is a plausible claim or 
not is still discussed by legal philosophers of both legal cultures. 
 
Be this as it may, ‘open texture’ has not been perceived as a problem in France for long, 
neither in public nor in private law. As for the interpretation of the written rule of recognition, 
it was not so much about the meaning of the rule, as about its extension and place within the 
legal system. 
 
In the Third Republic, the question was whether a bunch of statutes could be considered as the 
constitution. This was the ‘longest Republic’ until now and – regarding their structures and 
institutional operations –the British and French legal systems were very similar during this 
period. The rule of recognition or the ultima ratio of the validity of legal rules was in both 
cases the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. This institutional framework was termed 
‘legal state’ (l’Etat légal) by Carré de Malberg. In this context, his criticism of the pyramidal 
structure of law as developed by Merkl and Kelsen questioned the ‘generality’ and 
‘abstractness’ of legal philosophy. Carré de Malberg argued that the Stufenbaulehre cannot be 
right, since in the absence of a constitution the normative structure of the Third Republic does 
not fit into this theory at all. The only basic (and ‘unwritten’) norm is the provision to respect 
the will of the majority. If the pure theory cannot be applied to the French system, then it is a 
wrong theory (see Carré de Malberg 2007 [1932]). Otto Pfersmann rejects Carré de Malberg’s 
argument and writes that a particular social practice (the one which existed during the Third 
Republic) cannot invalidate an abstract theoretical construction, like the one elaborated by 
Merkl and Kelsen (see Pfersmann 1997). 
 
By the time historical circumstances gave birth to substantive constitutional adjudication in 
the Fifth Republic, in 1971, interpretive attitudes towards the rule of recognition had been 
well established in French legal mentality and practice. For a legal philosopher, the basic 
questions of legal interpretation and the justification of constitutional adjudication are still 
open for discussion. Yet one should be very careful when discussing canons of constitutional 
interpretation. French, British and American textualist (‘originalist’) schools, for example, 
show similarity in terms of their conclusions but they justify these in different ways. In 
addition, an analysis can show why the Dworkinian theory of ‘moral reading’ cannot be 




The last Hartian problem is related to the difference between a legal and a moral obligation. 
According to classical French doctrines, the ultimate reason to obey the law cannot be 
identified in the field of legal science. If the question is dealt with in a normative way then it 
is political philosophy that has a ‘scholarly’ competence, while for a descriptive approach it is 
sociology. Rather than speaking of a rule of recognition, French scholars tend to use the 
notion of a ‘constituent power’ (pouvoir constituant). This notion would be the theoretical 
substitute for the social contract, a ‘hypothetical basic norm’ in the Kelsenian sense, even 
though the same concept came into play in political and/or legal discourses during the 
Enlightenment (see Klein 1996). In the French Republican tradition, arguments from natural 
rights had never been plausible until the last decades of the 20th century. Instead, such rights 
were considered as political programmes. 
 
For Hart, the rule of recognition as the ultimate criterion of legal validity is neither valid nor 
invalid itself: it is merely accepted by the courts (at least). In the French context, the existence 
or non-existence of some distinguished social fact, like an accomplished revolution, 
determines whether the commands of the parliamentary majority are obligatory for the 
officials or not. The interpretation of these social facts is always a political question. The 
‘Frenchness’ of the French legal system can be defined as the adherence in its spirit to the 
idea of ‘equality’, understood in its material sense in most cases. 
 
If ‘validity’ means that a given legal norm makes part of the legal system, French doctrines 
can be divided into at least three main groups: normative, sociological and moral theories. 
Carré de Malberg gave a Kelsenian answer to this problem, Duguit followed Durkheim’s 
path, and Maritain elaborated the natural lawyer’s perspective. The potential of Hart’s legacy 
is shown in this field, too: his criticism of normativism (pace Kelsen), realism (pace Ross) 
and the ‘old fashioned’ way of natural law thinking can help to understand why French 
doctrines fail to justify the obligatory force of law.  
Let us see three French strategies to avoid the very problem of normativity. I will call them as 
follows: strategy of exclusion, transformation and saturation. In order to save the scientific 
purity and objectivity, Carré de Malberg excludes the ultuma ratio for normativity from the 
field of scholarly research. In the French case this ultima ratio would be the “constituent 
power”. For Carré de Malberg this notion is not legal which means by virtue of the negation 
that it is political and this is the reason why one cannot treat it at all within legal scholarship. 
Duguit argues that social science like jurisprudence should deal with social facts. The 
solidarity which creates societal links among individuals recognized by the legislator as law is 
a social fact, too. In order to explain this notion, classical theories of justice – like Aristotle’s 
or Thomas Aquinas’ –  must be transformed into sociology. A scholar can take into account 
these theories in this form because of their scientific character. However, one cannot analyse 
the normativity of the law or morality, because facts do not have any normativity. Among 
these three scholars, only Maritain takes “seriously” the problem of the obligatory force of 
law. But his theory which claims that law is necessarily connected to morality and an unjust 
law is not law at all, fails when it tries to justify why the validity of legal norms must be 
saturated by morality and what kind of morality can overlap different individuals’ ideological 




In this essay I argued that the three Hartian questions formulated at the outset of his Concept 
of Law can be seen as general problems of legal philosophy. It goes without saying that one 
can formulate these questions or ‘perplexities’ in different ways, too. My claim was that legal 
philosophy, i.e. a non-empirical analysis of basic legal problems, is a legitimate enterprise and 
this position is supported by a philosophical explanation. For the sake of this argument, I used 
the concept of ‘spirit’. I do not claim that other general problems different from Hart’s 
perplexities cannot exist. One can find others like the gaps and other inconsistencies of legal 
systems, the relation between law and economics, literature or religion, etc. One can discuss 
whatever seems important but what one cannot do is to neglect the very problem of 
normativity, at least if one claims that what one does is legal philosophy. Research in the field 
of French legal scholarship can show certain paths which in most cases try to avoid the 
problem of normativity. Yet, if someone scrutinises their final axioms, one will discover that 
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